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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
I. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW
A. Procedural Requirements Protect Carrier's Right of
Subrogation
Under the provisions of the South Carolina Workmen's
Compensation Act, a recovery against a third party tortfeasor
after the employee receives workmen's compensation benefits is
subject to an insurance carrier's statutory lien.1 In Fisher v.
1. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-1-560(b) (1976). This section provides in pertinent part:
The injured employee or, in the event of his death, his dependents, shall
be entitled to receive the compensation and other benefits provided by this
Title and to enforce by appropriate proceedings his or their rights against the
third party; provided that action against the third party must be commenced
not later than one year after the carrier accepts liability for the payment of
compensation or makes payment pursuant to an award under this Title, except
as hereinafter provided. In such case the carrier shall have a lien on the pro-
ceeds of any recovery from the third party whether by judgment, settlement or
otherwise, to the extent of the total amount of compensation, including medi-
cal and other expenses, paid, or to be paid by such carrier, less the reasonable
and necessary expenses, including attorney fees, incurred in effecting the re-
covery, and to the extent the recovery shall be deemed to be for the benefit of
the carrier.... Any balance remaining after payment of necessary expenses
and satisfaction of the carrier's lien shall be applied as a credit against future
compensation benefits for the same injury or death and shall be distributed as
provided in subsection (g) of this section. Notice of the commencement of the
action shall be given within thirty days thereafter to the Industrial Commis-
sion, the employer and carrier upon a form prescribed by the Industrial
Commission.
(emphasis in original).
See generally A. CusTY, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION IN SOUTH CAROLINA
1
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South Carolina Dep't. of Mental Retardation-Coastal Center,2
the South Carolina Supreme Court fortified this protection of a
carrier's interest. The court held that an employee who accepts a
third party settlement without the insurance carrier's consent
has elected his remedy and is therefore precluded from collect-
ing additional benefits under the South Carolina Workmen's
Compensation Act.3 This decision is in accord with the rule fol-
lowed by most jurisdictions.4
The claimant was injured at a Sears store when she fell
while shopping for clothes for residents of her employer's facil-
ity, the South Carolina Department of Mental Retardation.5 Af-
ter collecting a small amount in workmen's compensation bene-
fits,6 the claimant proceeded against Sears and accepted a
compromise settlement without obtaining the carrier's consent.
7
The claimant then attempted to recover benefits under the
South Carolina Workmen's Compensation Act.' The single com-
missioner, full commission, and circuit court dismissed her
claim, and found that she had no remedy under the South Caro-
§ 13.2.1 (1977) for a discussion of the statute.
2. 277 S.C. 573, 291 S.E.2d 200 (1982).
3. Id. at 575, 291 S.E.2d at 201.
4. E.g., Hornback v. Indus. Comm'n, 106 Ariz. 216, 474 P.2d 807 (1970); Travelers
Ins. Co. v. Haden, 418 A.2d 1078 (D.C. 1980); Berenberg v. Park Memorial Chapel, 286
A.D. 167, 142 N.Y.S.2d 345 (1955). Many states have codified this rule as part of their
Workmen's Compensation Act. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-293 (West 1972);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.39 (West Supp. 1981); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 656.587 (Smith-
Hurd 1981); VA. CODE § 65.1-41 (1980). See generally 2A A. LARsON, THE LAW OF WORK-
MEN'S COMPENSATION § 74.17(a) (1982).
5. 277 S.C. at 574, 291 S.E.2d at 201. It was undisputed that Mrs. Fisher suffered a
compensable injury.
6. Mrs, Fisher collected $61.80 in workmen's compensation benefits before she de-
cided to pursue an action against Sears. Record at 11, 25.
7. 274 S.C. at 574, 291 S.E.2d at 201. Mrs. Fisher settled her claim against Sears for
$10,000 an amount less than the available coverage and below the anticipated workmen's
compensation claim. Record at 12, 27; Brief for Respondents at 8. In settling her claim,
Mrs. Fisher executed a written release and an order of discontinuance which discharged
Sears from all further claims arising out of the accident. Record at 27, 31-32.
Prior to the settlement, Mrs. Fisher submitted to Sears an affidavit in which she
stated, "I have not received workmens [sic] compensation payments as a result of my
injury.., occurring at Sears Roebuck Company while working at the Mental Retarda-
tion Coastal Center, and I am not now receiving compensation payments from the State
Workmen's Compensation Fund." Id. at 27, 31. Because Sears made the settlement with-
out notice or knowledge of the workmen's compensation carrier's lien, the settlement was
not binding against the carrier. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-1-560(f) (Supp. 1982); Brief for
Respondent at 9. See infra note 20.
8. Now codifed at S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 42-1-10 to 42-19-40, (1976 & Supp. 1981).
2
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lina Workmen's Compensation Act because she had elected a
remedy against a third party tortfeasor without complying with
section 42-1-560 (Supp. 1981) of the South Carolina Code of
Laws." On appeal, the supreme court affirmed.10
The court noted that an injured employee has three reme-
dies for job-related injuries: proceed solely against the employer,
proceed solely against the third party tortfeasor, or proceed
against both the employer and the third party by complying
with section 42-1-560.11 This section does not specifically state
that settlement with a third party without the carrier's consent
constitutes an election of remedies. The supreme court, however,
determined that the legislature did not intend to allow a claim-
ant to pursue workmen's compensation benefits and to settle a
third party claim while disregarding the carrier's right of subro-
gation. 2 Citing Stroy v. Millwood Drug Store, Inc.," the court
reasoned that to allow an injured employee to destroy a carrier's
right to reimbursement from a third party" would run counter
to the statute's purpose of effecting an equitable adjustment of
the rights of all the parties.15 The claimant's noncompliance 6
with the statutory procedure violated the spirit of the Act and
constituted an election of remedies which precluded the claim-
ant from collecting additional workmen's compensation
benefits."
9. 299 S.C. at 574, 291 S.E.2d at 200-01. See supra note 1.
10. Id. at 291, S.E.2d at 201.
11. Id. at 575, 291 S.E.2d at 201.
12. Id. at 291, S.E.2d at 201.
13. 235 S.C. 52, 109 S.E.2d 706 (1959). In Stroy, the South Carolina Supreme Court
held that an employee's action in prosecuting the third party action to a final determina-
tion barred his right to workmen's compensation benefits. Id. at 60, 109 S.E.2d at 710. In
deciding Stroy the court followed its earlier decisions in Taylor v. Mount Vernon-Wood-
berry Mills, Inc., 211 S.C. 414, 45 S.E.2d 809 (1947), and Gardner v. City of Columbia
Police Dep't, 216 S.C. 219, 57 S.E.2d 308 (1950). In Taylor and Gardner, the court held
that when an injured employee settles his third party action without the knowledge or
consent of his employer, the settlement is a bar to an action for workmen's compensation
benefits. These cases, however, were decided under a previous workmen's compensation
act which did not permit injured employees to pursue both claims. See infra note 18 and
accompanying text.
14. See supra note 7.
15. 277 S.C. at 575-76, 291 S.E.2d at 201.
16. Mrs. Fisher failed to comply with the procedural requirements implicit in S.C.
CoDE ANN. § 42-1-560(b) (1976) when she settled her claim against Sears without the
carrier's consent or the Industrial Commission's approval.
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Prior to 1974, an employee who sustained job-related inju-
ries, caused by a third party, could either collect workmen's
compensation benefits or recover damages from the third party
in an action at law. The recovery of one was a bar to the other.1 8
In 1974 the legislature amended the South Carolina Workmen's
Compensation Act to permit injured employees to simultane-
ously pursue workmen's compensation benefits and damages
from third parties.19 The amendment, now codified as section
42-1-560, protects an insurance carrier's subrogation rights by
imposing a statutory lien on the proceeds of the third party re-
covery to the extent of the total amount of compensation paid or
to be paid by the carrier.2 0 Section 42-1-560 is thus designed to
achieve an equitable adjustment of the rights of all parties by
allowing injured employee's to pursue both remedies while pro-
tecting the subrogation rights of the carrier."-
The supreme court's decision in Fisher furthers an equita-
ble result for all parties in a workmen's compensation case by
forcing a claimant to comply with the procedural requirements
of section 42-1-560. The court's construction of the statute fol-
lows the majority view" that a claimant who settles a third
party claim without the carrier's consent has elected a remedy
and may not collect additional workmen's compensation bene-
fits. Injured employees can easily avoid the result in Fisher by
obtaining the carrier's consent to any third party settlement.3
Compliance with statutory procedure will allow an injured em-
ployee to simultaneously pursue workmen's compensation bene-
elected to pursue the remedy provided in S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-1-550 (1976) which pro-
vides that injured employees "may institute an action at law against such third person
before an award is made under this Title and prosecute it to its final determination."
18. S.C. CODE ANN. § 72-123 (1962).
19. S.C. CODE ANN. § 72-126.1 (Supp. 1975).
20. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-1-560(b) (1976). See supra note 1. Section 42-1-560(f)
(Supp. 1982) provides additional protection for the insurance carrier's statutory lien.
This section states that an employee's compromise settlement with a third party is not
binding against the carrier's right to reimbursement if: (1) the settlement was accepted
without the carrier's written consent, (2) the third party had notice or knowledge of the
carrier's lien, and (3) the settlement was for an amount less than the total workmen's
compensation to which the employee was entitled. See supra note 7.
21. 277 S.C. at 575, 291 S.E.2d at 201.
22. See supra note 4.
23. If the carrier refuses to approve the proposed compromise settlement, S.C. CODE
ANN. § 42-1-560(f) (Supp. 1982) allows the claimant to petition the Industrial Commis-
sion for approval of the settlement.
4
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fits and third party damages under section 42-1-560 while pro-
tecting the carrier's subrogation rights.
Stephen E. Hudson
B. When Death by Occupational Disease may be Considered
Accidental Injury
In Marquard v. Pacific Columbia Mills24 the South Carolina
Supreme Court affirmed the State Industrial Commission's find-
ing that a decedent's widow was entitled to death benefits under
the state workmen's compensation statute.25 The court found
substantial evidence in the record to support the Commission's
holding that the decedent suffered from an occupational disease,
byssinosis, which placed an unusual strain on his heart and led
to his fatal heart attack.2" The court approved the Commission's
finding that the decedent died of an accidental injury, heart at-
tack, rather than an occupational disease. The court then upheld
the Commission's denial of the defendant's motion to submit to
a medical board the question whether the decedent suffered
from an occupational disease.2 7 This decision is clearly in dero-
gation of the statutory language that the Commission shall upon
motion of either party to the proceeding, submit any question
concerning the existence of a disease to the medical board.28
Plaintiff's decedent worked in the card room of Pacific Co-
lumbia Mills for fifteen years. 29 At the hearing, the plaintiff tes-
24. - S.C. _, 295 S.E.2d 870 (1982).
25. Id., 295 S.E.2d 870. The court relied on S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 42-1-10 to -11-200
(1976 & Supp. 1981).
26. - S.C. at -, 295 S.E.2d at 871.
27. Id. at -, 295 S.E.2d at 871.
28. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-11-120 (1976) provides the procedure for determining
claims:
The procedure for determining claims for benefits from an occupational
disease shall be the same as that followed in determining other claims under
this Title, save that if any medical question shall be in controversy the Com-
mission may, upon its own motion, and shall, upon motion of either party to
the proceeding, refer the question to the medical board as provided in this
chapter for investigation and report. A medical question shall be deemed to
include any issue concerning the existence, cause and duration of a disease or
disability, the date of disablement, the degree of disability and the proportion
thereof attributable to a noncompensable cause and any other matter necessa-
rily pertinent thereto requiring the opinion of experts.
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tified that the decedent came home from work covered with cot-
ton dust, that he complained of shortness of breath, and that he
had a noticeable cough that worsened on Monday nights.30 She
also testified that for a few weeks before his death, the decedent
had complained of pains in his arms.3 ' He died of heart failure
at work, 32 but he had not been under any unusual strain or exer-
tion at the time.3
The plaintiff's action began before the Industrial Commis-
sion, where she sought recovery on the theory that the dece-
dent's occupational disease had proximately caused his fatal
heart attack.34 After the Commission heard testimony from the
plaintiff's witnesses, the defendant moved to submit to a medi-
cal board the question whether the decedent had actually suf-
fered from byssinosis e5 The Commission denied this motion,38
and both the circuit court and the supreme court 7 affirmed.
The supreme court reasoned that "[t]he circuit court and
this Court are bound by the Commission's decision unless
clearly erroneous in view of the substantial evidence on the
whole record.13 8 The Commission had held the medical question
provision of the statute "inapplicable to a claim based upon an
accidental injury arising out of and in the course of employ-
ment."39 Three members of the supreme court agreed with this
determination and found substantial evidence in the record to
of the mill has a higher concentration of cotton dust than others." Id. at n.l., 295 S.E.2d
at 870, n.1.
30. - S.C. at -, 295 S.E.2d at 870; Record at 219-20. Symptoms of byssinosis
include tightness in the chest and wheezing, particularly on Mondays when the employee
is first exposed to cotton dust after a weekend away from work. Record at 148-49.
31. Record at 221.
32. Id. at 236.
33. - S.C. at -, 295 S.E.2d at 872 (Gregory, A.J., concurring and dissenting);
Record at 221.
34. Record at 217-18.
35. Id. at 239-41.
36. Id. at 240.41.
37. - S.C. at -, 295 S.E.2d at 870.
38. Id. at -, 295 S.E.2d at 871.
39. Record at 240. The Commission also noted that even if the claim were based
upon the existence of an occupational disease, the submission of the medical question to
the medical board would "serve no purpose other then [sic] to delay the ultimate deci-
sion." Id. The Commission thought that the medical board would merely make an inde-
pendent determination based upon evidence already before the Commission, and that
the statutory purpose did not encompass "[s]uch a delegation of the decision making
authority of the Commission ...... Id. at 241.
[Vol. 35
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support the Commission's holding that the decedent's employ-
ment conditions had caused the occupational disease which led
to the heart attack. 0 The majority reasoned that the term "acci-
dental injury" includes "unexpected events caused by employ-
mentrelated disease. "4'  The court seems to have classified the
decedent's heart attack as an unexpected result of an employ-
ment-related disease; thus, according to the court, the heart at-
tack was compensable as an accidental injury arising out of and
in the course of employment.42 Under this line of reasoning the
question whether the decedent suffered from an occupational
disease became moot, and no medical question existed.4 3
The court's decision in Marquard is the result of an errone-
ous reading of the Workmen's Compensation statute. The statu-
tory scheme provides compensation for death resulting from in-
jury by accident." An employee or his beneficiaries may recover
for accidental injury by proving either that the employee suf-
fered from an occupational disease45 or that he experienced an
accidental injury arising out of and in the course of his employ-
ment.46 Under the occupational disease provision, the claimant
must prove that the employee suffered from one of the statuto-
rily defined employment-related diseases. 7 If either party in the
40. - S.C. at -, 295 S.E.2d at 871. Justice Ness wrote the majority opinion in
which Justices Lewis and Harwell concurred. Justices Gregory and Littlejohn concurred
in part, but dissented on the medical question issue. Id., 295 S.E.2d at 871.
41. Id., 295 S.E.2d at 871.
42. Id., 295 S.E.2d at 871. See infra note 44.
43. - S.C. at -, 295 S.E.2d at 871.
44. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-1-110 (1976) states that "[t]he term 'death' as a basis for
right to compensation means only death resulting from an injury." (Emphasis in origi-
nal). Section 42-1-160 defines injury as "only injury by accident arising out of and in the
course of the employment and shall not include a disease in any form, except.., such
diseases as are compensable under the provisions of Chapter 11 of this Title." Chapter
11 of the Title covers occupational diseases. See infra note 47.
45. S.C. CODE ALNN. § 42-11-40 (1976) provides in part that the "disablement or
death of an employee resulting from an occupational disease shall be treated as an injury
by accident. .. ."
46. See supra note 44.
47. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-11-10 (1976) defines occupational disease as follows:
The words "occupational disease" mean a disease arising out of and in the
course of employment which is due to hazards in excess of those ordinarily
incident to employment and is peculiar to the occupation in which the em-
ployee is engaged. A disease shall be deemed an occupational disease only if
caused by a hazard recognized as peculiar to a particular trade, process, occu-
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proceedings requests that this question be determined by a med-
ical board, the Commission must grant the request, and a medi-
cal board must decide whether the employee had an occupa-
tional disease.48 Under the accidental injury prong of the statute
the claimant must prove that the employee's injury was acciden-
tal, that it arose out of the employment, and that it occurred in
the course of employment.49 Generally, the claimant meets these
requirements by showing that the injury was unusual, unex-
pected, and unintentional, 50 that the employment was the proxi-
mate cause of the injury,51 and that the employee was "at work"
when the injury occurred.
5 2
No disease shall be deemed an occupational disease when:
(1) It does not result directly and naturally from exposure in this
State to the hazards particular to the particular employment;
(2) It results from exposure to outside climatic conditions;
(3) It is a contagious disease resulting from exposure to fellow em-
ployees or from a hazard to which the workman would have been
equally exposed outside of his employment;
(4) It is one of the ordinary diseases of life to which the general
public is equally exposed, unless such disease follows as a complication
and a natural incident of an occupational disease or unless there is a
constant exposure peculiar to the occupation itself which makes such a
disease a hazard inherent in such occupation;
(5) It is any disease of the cardiac, pulmonary or circulatory system
not resulting directly from abnormal external gaseous pressure exerted
upon the body or the natural entrance into the body through the skin or
natural orifices thereof of foreign organic or inorganic nfatter under cir-
cumstances peculiar to the employment and the processes utilized
therein; or
(6) It is any chronic disease of the skeletal joints.
(Emphasis in original).
48. See supra note 28.
49. See supra note 44.
50. The court has found a compensable accident when "tihe cause and the result
were unexpected, unusual and unintended...." Riley v. South Carolina State Ports
Auth., 253 S.C. 621, 627, 172 S.E.2d 657, 660 (1970). See also Colvin v. E.L du Pont de
Nemours Co., 227 S.C. 465, 88 S.E.2d 581 (1955); Hiers v. Brunson Constr. Co., 221 S.C.
212, 70 S.E.2d 211 (1952).
51. "An accident 'arises out of the employment' when the employment is a contrib-
uting proximate cause." Beam v. State Workmen's Comp. Fund, 261 S.C. 327, 331, 200
S.E.2d 83, 85 (1973). See also Carter v. Penney Tire & Recapping Co., 261 S.C. 341, 200
S.E.2d 64 (1973); Douglas v. Spartan Mills, Startex Div., 245 S.C. 265, 140 S.E.2d 173
(1965).
52. The court has held that:
[A]n injury arises in the course of employment within the meaning of the
Workmen's Compensation Act when it occurs within the period of the employ-
ment at a place where the employee reasonably may be in the performance of
his duties, and while he is fulfilling those duties, or engaged in doing something
8
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In heart attack cases, the claimant usually seeks compensa-
tion under the accidental injury prong of the statute. The court
has generally found a heart attack to be an injury by accident,5"
i.e.-unexpected and unforeseeable but not arising out of and in
the course of employment unless the attack results from some
unusual strain or exertion not normally incident to the employ-
ment.54 In Marquard, the decedent's heart attack did not result
from any unusual strain or exertion.55 According to undisputed
testimony, the decedent was returning from lunch when he
died.5 6 Therefore, under the unusual strain or exertion rule, the
plaintiff clearly should not have been able to recover workmen's
compensation benefits by claiming her husband's death was
caused by an employment-related injury.
To circumvent the unusual strain or exertion rule the plain-
tiff argued that the decedent suffered from an employment-re-
lated disease which proximately caused the heart attack, and
therefore the heart attack should be interpreted as an injury
arising out of and in the course of employment.57 Because exis-
tence of the occupational disease was a crucial element of the
plaintiff's cause of action, she should have been required to
prove the existence of the alleged disease, as required by the oc-
cupational disease provision of the statute.
The Commission, however, ruled that the plaintiff did not
have to prove her claim before a medical board.58 The supreme
court limited the scope of its review and held that it was bound
by the Commission's findings unless they were clearly errone-
ous.59 Admittedly, the Commission's findings of fact were not
incidental thereto.
Fowler v. Abbott Motor Co., 236 S.C. 226, 230, 113 S.E.2d 737, 739 (1960). See also
Beam v. State Workmen's Comp. Fund, 261 S.C. 327, 200 S.E.2d 83 (1973); Douglas v.
Spartan Mills, Startex Div., 245 S.C. 265, 140 S.E.2d 173 (1965).
53. Robinson v. City of Cayce, 265 S.C. 441, 219 S.E.2d 835 (1975); Pellum v. W.C.
Chaplin Transp., 249 S.C. 348, 154 S.E.2d 432 (1967); Wynn v. Peoples Natural Gas Co.,
238 S.C. 1, 118 S.E.2d 812 (1961); Kearse v. S.C. Wildlife Resources Dep't, 236 S.C. 540,
115 S.E.2d 183 (1960).
54. McWhorter v. S.C. Dep't of Ins., 252 S.C. 90, 165 S.E.2d 365 (1969); Sims v. S.C.
State Comm'n of Forestry, 235 S.C. 1, 109 S.E.2d 701 (1959). See also cases cited supra
note 53.
55. - S.C. at -, 295 S.E.2d at 872 (Gregory, A.J., concurring and dissenting).
56. Record at 221.
57. Id. at 217-18.
58. Id. at 240-41.
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clearly erroneous. The supreme court was probably correct in
deciding that "ample evidence" existed in the record to support
the Commission's finding that the decedent suffered from a
work-related disease that proximately caused his fatal heart at-
tack. Both the Commission and the court, however, misread the
statute. As evidenced by the defendant's motion to submit the
question to the Board, the existence of an occupational disease
was clearly at issue. The statutory language does not give the
Commission an option to submit the question only if it agrees
that a medical question exists; the statutory language is
mandatory.6 0 Upon motion by either party-and at any point in
its hearings-the Commission must refer any issue concerning
the existence of a disease to the medical board.
The court's reluctance to remand this case for such a tech-
nical misreading of the statute is not surprising in light of its
longstanding policy of broadly construing the Workmen's Com-
pensation statute to best effectuate the statute's purpose of ben-
efitting employees and their dependents."1 The result of the
court's error, however, is not so easily reconciled. The plaintiff's
claim that the decedent died of a heart attack at work was
clearly not compensable under South Carolina workmen's com-
pensation law. 2 The plaintiff therefore claimed that the exis-
tence of an occupational disease proximately caused the heart
attack. This innovative theory provided the link necessary to'
qualify the heart attack as an accidental injury arising out of
and in the course of employment. When the defendant moved to
have the disease question decided by a medical board, however,
as provided in the chapter on occupational disease, the Commis-
sion, and later the court, held that the occupational disease
chapter was inapplicable because the claim was for an accidental
injury. 3 The supreme court allowed the plaintiff to use the al-
leged existence of an occupational disease to recover under the
statute without requiring her to follow the mandatory statutory
procedure for proving the existence of that disease. Thus, the
60. See supra note 28.
61. See, e.g., Carter v. Penney Tire & Recapping Co., 261 S.C. 341, 200 S.E.2d 64
(1973); Douglas v. Spartan Mills, Startex Div., 245 S.C. 265, 140 S.E.2d 173 (1965); Price
v. B.F. Shaw Co., 224 S.C. 89, 77 S.E.2d 491 (1953).
62. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
63. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 35
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defendant in Marquard was denied, through the court's "Catch-
22" ruling, the statute's protection against having compensable
diseases being diagnosed by unqualified administrative and judi-
ciary bodies.
The implications of Marquard are unclear. The court cor-
rectly applied the "clearly erroneous" standard of review and
properly concluded that the Commission's findings of fact were
not clearly erroneous. However, the court incorrectly assumed
that the Commission had discretion to determine whether the
decedent suffered from an occupational disease and then use the
results of its investigation to grant or deny the defendant's mo-
tion. Both the Commission and the court incorrectly allowed the
plaintiff, whose decedent died from an occupational disease,
"[tlo disregard the provisions of the Occupational Disease Chap-
ter of the Workmen's Compensation Act by pursuing his claim
as one for accidental injury."65 The court's split decision 6 indi-
cates that the holding may be limited to these particular facts,
and a well-reasoned argument may convince the court to disre-
gard Marquard as precedent.
Karen E. Molony
II. HUMAN AFFAIRS LAW: INVESTIGATION BY COMMISSION DOES
NOT GIVE RISE TO JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY
As the first case decided under the amended South Carolina
Human Affairs Law,67 Orr v. Clyburn" indicates the supreme
court's willingness to exercise judicial self-restraint in dealing
with the Commission on Human Affairs. The court held that an
employer being investigated for discrimination may not seek a
declaratory judgment that he is not subject to the Commission's
proceedings because an investigation does not in itself give rise
to a justiciable controversy.6 9 This holding is in accord with the
rule in other American jurisdictions."0
64. Brief for Appellants at 12.
65. - S.C. at -, 295 S.E.2d at 872 (Gregory, A.J., concurring and dissenting).
66. See supra note 40.
67. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-13-10 to -110 (1976 & Supp. 1982).
68. 277 S.C. 536, 290 S.E.2d 804 (1982).
69. 277 S.C. at 540, 290 S.E.2d at 807.
70. See, e.g., Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Weinberger, 384 F. Supp. 557 (S.D.N.Y. 1974);
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On May 21, 1979, Nancy Grant Raines applied to Chester
County Sheriff Orr for a position as deputy sheriff. When she
was not hired, Ms. Raines filed a complaint with the respondent
Commission on Human Affairs alleging that the sheriff denied
her the position because of her race and sex. The Commission
subsequently notified Sheriff Orr that it was investigating the
charge against him.7 1
Orr, individually and as representative of all South Carolina
sheriffs, sought both a declaratory judgment that the Human Af-
fairs Law did not apply to sheriffs and injunctive relief from the
Commission's investigation. 2 His complaint asserted that he
had no adequate remedy at law to restrain the Commission from
acting further on Raines' complaint and that its investigation
could result in a Commission order to hire her.73 The respondent
demurred to the complaint. The trial court granted the demur-
rer on the grounds that the court lacked jurisdiction and because
the complaint failed to state a cause of action warranting declar-
atory and injunctive relief.7 4 On appeal, the supreme court
affirmed.
In upholding the demurrer, the court first took judicial no-
tice that the legislature had amended the statutory provision
which allegedly gave the Commission the power to order the hir-
ing of Ms. Raines.7 5 The amended act provides that the order to
hire an applicant may only issue from a judge after a proceeding
initiated by the Commission.76 Therefore, the court concluded
Orr's claim that he would be irreparably harmed if the Commis-
sion ordered him to hire Ms. Raines was moot.
77
County of San Diego, 212 Cal. App. 2d 707, 28 Cal. Rptr. 196 (1963).
71. 277 S.C. at 539, 290 S.E.2d at 805-06.
72. Id., 290 S.E.2d at 806.
73. Id., 290 S.E.2d at 806. Appellant also alleged that this order would violate his
constitutional rights of due process and equal protection because, as a sheriff, he would
be vicariously liable in tort for damages caused by his servant. Record at 10.
74. 277 S.C. at 539, 290 S.E.2d at 805.
75. Id., 290 S.E.2d at 806.
76. Under S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-13-90(d) (Supp. 1982), which discusses proceedings
involving "employers ... including counties," the Commission is no longer empowered
to order a county employer such as the sheriff to hire an applicant. Cf. S.C. CODE ANN. §
1-13-90(d)(14) (1976). The Commission may conduct an investigation and decide
whether to bring an action in equity in a court of common pleas, S.C. CODE ANN. § 113-
90(d)(7) (Supp. 1982), and the court may order the applicant to be hired, S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 1.13-90(d)(9) (Supp. 1982).
77. 277 S.C. at 539-40, 290 S.E.2d at 806.
[Vol. 35
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The court next turned to Orr's allegation that he was irrepa-
rably injured by the Commission's continuing investigation 8
and held that Orr's complaint did not present a justiciable con-
troversy.7 1 The court gave four reasons for its determination.
First, because the final step of the Commission's investiga-
tion-a decision to bring an action in equity-could not deter-
mine any of Orr's legal rights, due process considerations did not
arise. 0 Second, the Commission's decision to bring an action in
equity at the conclusion of its investigation was expressly pre-
cluded from judicial review by statute.8 " Third, the investigation
could terminate before its conclusion without the court's inter-
vention.8 2 Fourth, the Commission did not have any interest ad-
verse to Orr.ss The court concluded that the dispute presented
in Orr's complaint was contingent and hypothetical and, there-
fore, inappropriate for judicial determination.
8 4
The significance of Orr v. Clyburn to the attorney practicing
administrative law in South Carolina depends on how narrowly
one reads this decision. Given a narrow reading, Orr may apply
only to the limited investigatory nature of the Commission's
78. The appellant objected that the agency had no power to investigate, that the
investigation might lead to a court action against him and that the investigation would
require him to spend time and money to furnish the Commission with any information
requested. Brief for Appellant at 7-9.
79. 277 S.C. at 540, 290 S.E.2d at 807. The court cited Notios Corp. v. Hanvey, 256
S.C. 275, 182 S.E.2d 55 (1979), for the proposition that a justiciable controversy is one
which is real, substantial, ripe, and appropriate for judicial determination.
80. 277 S.C. at 540-41, 290 S.E.2d at 806. The court analogized the South Carolina
Human Affairs Act to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(1)-(17)
(1976), and then cited Georator Corp. v. EEOC, 592 F.2d 765 (4th Cir. 1979). See also
S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-13-100 (Supp. 1982) which states that the Human Affairs law does
not create any cause of action that Title VII does not also create.
81. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-13-90(d)(4) (Supp. 1982).
82. The investigation could terminate by a Commission finding that it did not have
jurisdiction, by a finding that the complaint was without merit, or by Ms. Raines' re-
quest to terminate the investigation so that she could personally sue. - S.C. at -, 290
S.E.2d at 807.
83. The court asserted that the applicant was the only person with any possible
adverse interest to Orr. Id. at 542, 290 S.E.2d at 807.
84. Id. 290 S.E.2d at 807. The court also set fofth several policy reasons for refusing
to allow declaratory relief: (1) the mere inconvenience of an investigation is part of the
burden of living under a system of government, Id. at 540, 290 S.E.2d at 806; (2) courts
should not interfere with an agency's discretionary powers, Id. at 542, 290 S.E.2d at 807;
(3) premature judicial intrusions disrupt the administrative process, Id. at 541, 290
S.E.2d at 807; and (4) merely taking a position and challenging the Commission to dis-
pute it is tantamount to asking for an advisory opinion, Id. at 542, 290 S.E.2d at 807.
13
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proceedings in this case.85 However, the opinion suggests a
broader interpretation by stating that even if an actual contro-
versy were to have been alleged by Orr, a declaratory judgment
was nevertheless inappropriate" because Orr should not be
given an opportunity to test his legal defenses until action is
properly initiated in court by the Commission. An expansive
reading of this decision indicates that, unless an investigatory
agency has enforcement power, one cannot impede its proper in-
quiries by haling it into court.
87
In conclusion, Orr v. Clyburn reassures state administrative
agencies that the courts will not prematurely intrude into their
delegated functions. This decision maintains the separation of
the administrative and judicial functions by characterizing the
inconvenience of a government investigation as part of the bur-
den of living under government and not an irreparable injury for
which declaratory relief lies.
Charles J. Baker, III
III. EMPLOYMENT SECURITY LAW: EMPLOYEE MISCONDUCT
In Lee v. South Carolina Employment Security Commis-
sion, s the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the Commis-
sion's application of a "fault" standard to determine whether
employee misconduct has occurred. 9 Lee is the first South Caro-
85. See supra note 76.
86. There is authority in the context of an Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission (EEOC) proceeding that the judiciary cannot intervene in the conciliatory phase
of the proceeding because the EEOC has no enforcement authority itself, but instead
must have the Attorney General enforce its order. Board of Goveruors of Wayne State
Univ. v. Perry, 17 EPD 8530 (E.D. Mich. 1976). The EEOC was created by Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(1)-(17) (1976), and its procedures are substan-
tially similar to those of the Human Affairs Commission. See supra note 80.
87. Such an interpretation of Orr does not necessarily conflict with the rule of Fort
Sumter Tours, Inc. v. Andrus, 440 F. Supp. 914 (D.S.C. 1977). There, the plaintiff's cau3e
was ripe for declaratory and injunctive relief because the Secretary of the Interior's ac-
tion would probably have run the plaintiff out of business. The plaintiff's right as a
practical matter could not be recovered in further administration action. This situation
is distinguishable from that of mere inconvenience caused by standard proceedings.
88. 277 S.C. 586, 291 S.E.2d 378 (1982).
89. Appellant challenged the Commission's definition of misconduct as a matter of
law. Brief for Appellant at 2. Thus, the court's decision in Lee is best considered as an
exercise in statutory construction rather than one of administrative review. Although
appellant also excepted to the Commission's application of the definition to the facts in
14
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lina case to provide the practitioner with a clear and workable
definition of "misconduct" under the Employment Security
law.9
0
Appellant worked as a sheet metal mechanic for a heating
and air conditioning contractor in Charleston, South Carolina.e"
He was fired after his employer was forced to correct mistakes
attributable to appellant's sloppy workmanship. During the six
months preceding his discharge, appellant was warned that his
work did not meet the standards required by his employer. After
a hearing conducted in accordance with the Employment Secur-
ity Law and Commission regulations,92 the full Commission de-
termined that appellant had in fact been discharged for "mis-
conduct" and disqualified him from receiving unemployment
benefits for a period of six weeks.93 Both the circuit court and
supreme court affirmed this decision."
In the leading case on misconduct, Boynton Cab Company
v. Neubeck,e5 the Wisconsin Supreme Court defined misconduct
as "wilful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest... or
carelessness or negligence of such degree or recurrence as to
manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil de-
sign .... ,, 9 Although that court implied in dicta that an aggra-
vated lack of proper regard for an employer's interests or stan-
dards could also constitute misconduct, 17 it quoted at great
length from an English case which suggested that mere incompe-
tence or a general failure to do right will never provide a basis
for misconduct. Wilfulness or wanton behavior is required."
the case, Brief for Appellant at 9, this exception was dismissed as without merit pursu-
ant to Supreme Court Rule 23. 277 S.C. at 589, 291 S.E.2d at 379. While Lee may raise
questions as to the scope or standard of review of administrative decisions in South Car-
olina courts, the opinion sheds no light on the state of the law in this area. For a thor-
ough review of recent decisions dealing with the standard of review under the state Ad-
ministrative Procedures Act, see South Carolina Administrative Procedures Act: The
Standard of Review for Administrative Agency Decisions, 34 S.C.L. REv. 11 (1982).
90. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 41-27-10 to -42-40 (1976 & Supp. 1981).
91. Record at 17.
92. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 41-35-610 to -750 (1976); S.C. Employment Sec. Comm'n
Reg. 47-21, 47-51 to -57 (1976).
93. Record at 26.
94. Id. at 34-36.
95. 237 Wis. 249, 296 N.W. 636 (1941).
96. Id. at 259-60, 296 N.W. at 640.
97. Id. at 260, 296 N.W. at 640.
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Other jurisdictions interpret Boynton Cab in two different ways.
Roughly half reject any fault criteria for misconduct and hold
that mere carelessness or sloppiness can never be grounds for
misconduct.9 Other jurisdictions focus on the "proper regard for
an employer's interests" language in Boynton Cab and look to
the surrounding circumstances to determine if the employee's
conduct did in fact rise to the level of misconduct.100 From a
claimant's standpoint, the former position is more desirable,
since an employer has more difficulty showing misconduct. In
Lee, however, South Carolina has clearly chosen to adopt the
latter position.
Application of a fault standard for misconduct is sound
statutory construction in light of the manifest legislative intent.
The stated legislative purpose of the Employment Security Law
is to provide compensation for those who become unemployed
"through no fault of their own."101 Therefore, when an employee
contributes to his discharge, he should be penalized. Section 41-
35-120(2) provides this penalty in cases of discharge for miscon-
duct.10 2 In Stone Manufacturing Company v. South Carolina
Employment Security Commission,1 03 the supreme court, inter-
preting a different term in the Employment Security Law, used
the same logic. Pointing out that the law was designed to benefit
99. See, e.g., Seavy and Jensen v. Industrial Comm'n, 523 P.2d 157 (Colo. Ct. App.
1974); In Re Collingsworth, 17 N.C. App. 340, 194 S.E.2d 210 (1973).
100. See, e.g., Sheink v. Maine Dep't of Manpower Affairs, 423 A.2d 519 (Me. 1980);
Heilman v. United Dressed Beef Co., 273 N.W.2d 628 (Minn. 1978); Marlette Homes,
Inc. v. Employment Div., 33 Or. App. 547, 577 P.2d 89 (1978).
101. S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-27-20 (1975).
102. S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-35-120(2) (1976) states as follows:
(2) Discharge for Misconduct-If the Commission finds that he has been
discharged for misconduct connected with his most recent work prior to filing a
request for determination of insured status or a request for initiation of a claim
series within an established benefit year, with such ineligibility beginning with
the effective date of such request, and continuing not less than five nor more
than the next twenty-six consecutive weeks (in addition to the waiting period),
as determined by the Commission in each case according to the seriousness of
the misconduct, and if the Commission finds that the misconduct for which the
insured worker was discharged was aggravated it may in its discretion cause to
be charged against the benefits to which the insured worker is entitled under §
41-35-50 an amount not to exceed his weekly benefit amount multiplied by the
number of weeks of his disqualification. Provided no charge of misconduct
shall be made for failure to meet production requirements unless such failure
is occasioned by wilful failure or neglect of duty.
103. 219 S.C. 239, 64 S.E.2d 644 (1951).
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working people who become unemployed because of forces in the
marketplace which are beyond their control, the court rejected
blameworthiness or culpability as requisites for fault.10'
Appellant suggested that the application of a fault standard
to determine misconduct would lead to an injustice to claim-
ants.05 While injustice may result if the Commission defined
misconduct as "mere incompetence", the facts in Lee suggest
that mere incompetence was not the basis on which appellant
was discharged. Mr. Lee was a capable and competent sheet
metal worker; he had received merit pay raises during his tenure
with his employer."0 6 In fact, his negligence rose to the level of
misconduct only after the quality of his work declined and after
he failed to heed the warnings of his employer.107 On these facts
the result in Lee is consistent with cases in more liberal jurisdic-
tions because even those courts concede that misconduct may be
inferred from a substantial degree of carelessness or negligence
when the carelessness or negligence does not stem from the em-
ployee's "inabilities or incapacities."1 8 Since appellant had ca-
pably performed in the past, his negligence was not due to in-
ability; thus, even under the liberal definition, his acts could be
characterized as misconduct. Despite the South Carolina court's
broad language suggesting that "causing losses to the employer"
was the reason appellant was guilty of misconduct,109 neither the
Commission nor the courts are likely to find misconduct where
unsatisfactory performance is simply due to incompetence or
inability.
Lee appears to provide South Carolina with a definition of
employee misconduct that includes both willful and wanton acts
and repeated negligent failure to perform to an employer's stan-
dards; but negligence should not rise to the level of misconduct
if it results from mere incompetence, inefficiency or inability.
While the supreme court's definition places South Carolina in a
more conservative position than those states following a more
104. Id. at 246, 64 S.E.2d at 646.
105. Brief for Appellant at 8.
106. Record at 20-21.
107. Id. at 17.
108. 237 Wis. at 259-60, 296 N.W. at 640.
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literal interpretation of Boyton Cab, the holding is consistent
with the mainstream of decisions in this area.11
W. Dixon Robertson, III
110. See supra notes 100 and 101 and accompanying text. A holding that equated
incompetence with misconduct would place South Carolina in an isolated minority.
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